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In Indonesia, as in most Asian countries, the term 'feudalism' 
became very popular in the 1930s and '40s. It was part of the 
jargon which nationalists accepted eagerly from Marxism, because 
it seemed to locate their own societies on a linear path of inevitable 
progress. By making an explicit analogy with European history, 
it emphasized that the royal courts and aristocratic officials 
protected by the colonial order were in fact anachronistic doomed 
relics of an earlier age. It helped legitimate the aspiration of 
nationalists to replace not only colonialism but also the internal 
hierachy based on birth by a more democratic order in which 
education and the skills of mass mobilization would be adequately 
rewarded. At a popular level 'feudal' became simply the pejorative 
equivalent for 'aristocratic' or 'traditional'. 
During the period of revolution this view was accepted not 
only by Marxists and by nationalist politicians like Sukarno,l but 
by most of those attempting to write serious history. The major 
national history of this period was entitled 'The Feudal Struggle 
of Indonesia".2 Recent Indonesian historians, on the other hand, 
have shared the caution of most outsiders on this issue, avoiding 
broad Europe-derived categories such as 'feudal' in favour of 
detailed description. 3 
A Southeast Asian Transition 
Even so, the 'big' categories like antiquity, slavery, feudalism 
and capitalism still serve to remind the historian of Asia, as of 
Europe, that some major transitions have encompassed a number 
of disparate societies, and therefore demand explanations that 
rise above the parochialism of culture or nation. In this paper 
we wish to focus attention on one such transition in Southeast 
Asia. It is the shift from a pattern of autocratic states dominated 
by their commercial port-capitals to one of power diffused among 
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chiefdoms or domains which recognized the aura of the earlier 
kingdoms without replicating their centralized military or legal 
coherence. Although the most important phase of this transition 
occurred in the late seventeenth century, its European parallells 
are rather those of the passage from Antiquity to Feudalism. 
The late sixteenth and still more the early seventeenth centuries 
witnessed a striking array of powerful city-centred kingdoms 
inspiring the admiration of European observers - the Burma of 
Kings Bayinnaung (1551-81) and Anaukhpetlun (1606-29); the 
Ayutthaya (Siam) of Kings Songtham and Prasat Thong (1610-56); 
the Mataram (Java) of Sultan Agung and Amangkurat I (1613-77); 
the Makassar of Sultans Mohammad Said and Hasanuddin (1639-69); 
and the Aceh of Sultans al-Mukammil and Iskandar Muda 
(1589-1636). The key features of these autocratic kingdoms might 
be classified as: 
1. Enormous armies mobilizing a large proportion of total available 
manpower. A small standing army of palace guards, foreign 
mercenaries, etc. Strict royal control of firearms. Numerous 
state captives resulting from wars of conquest. 
2. International trade centred at a single port under royal control 
(the capital in all cases except Mataram). Revenues of the 
crown largely dependent on the flourishing port, including 
a large sector of royal trade. 
3. Forced attendance at court for leading nobles of the realm. 
4. Some bureaucratizatiorr of government, with officials appointed 
at intervals rather than hereditary. 
5. Codification of laws and institutionalization of legal structures, 
frequently using lndic or Islamic models to justify centralised 
law-making by the court. 
ti. Development of an urban cosmopolitan culture, which completely 
dominated the countryside and provided the cultural model 
for later periods. 
Most historians, like most contemporary observers, have looked 
at these developments from the point of view of a single country, 
and have therefore explained the powerful autocracies in terms 
of the capacity of individual rulers, and subsequent diffusion of 
power as the result of internal conflict, external pressure, or 
the ineptitude of eighteenth century rulers. 4 Having pointed 
to a similar phenomenon in a number of countries, we are obliged 
to look for some underlying structural factors. The most important 
would appear to be international trade, firearms, and the role 
of Europeans in Asia. 
Until the middle third of the seventeenth centUI'y, the role 
of European traders and trading companies appeared to work in 
favour of strong rulers, apart perhaps from the disruptions caused 
by the first few years uf the Portuguese onslaught. In their pursuit 
of stable supplies of spices and other tropical goods, the Europeans 
preferred to make monopolistic agreements with rulers who 
appeared to control a lai'ge proportion of pepper or clove supplies, 
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thereby often getting the better of the Indian merchants or of 
European rivals. As the VOC took root in Asia, however, it fought 
hard for a total monopoly of Southeast Asian spices, eventually 
succeeding in destroying militarily the remaining indigenous ports 
of greatest significance in the spice trade - Banten and Makassar 
- while detaching the main pepper-producing areas from their 
allegiance to Aceh. The English, French, and Danes, who had 
been more active in encouraging the state trading of powerful 
rulers of Banten, Ayutthaya and Makassar, were expelled either 
by Dutch arms or by internal revolutions by the end of the 
seventeenth century. 
The earliest firearms to be adopted into Southeast Asian warfare 
were cannons. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries 
they were generally presented to, bought by, or made for the 
King alone. Certainly the stronger rulers made a point of 
controlling both the artillery and the gunpowder - a considerable 
departure from tradition in an area where no man considered 
himself adequately dressed without a keris or knife of some sort. 
As hand-held guns became more common and more effective, 
however, it became increasingly difficult for rulers to maintain 
such a monopoly on firearms. While the manufacture of cannon 
appears to have beer, limited to craftsmen working under royal 
patronage, muskets in the eighteenth century were being made 
and exported by craftsmen in Bali, the Bugis area, and Minangkabau 
-all areas with markedly fragmented political structures., 
More opaque than such external factors are the internal ones, 
having to do with the effectiveness and durability of the 
administrative structures built up during the p'eriod of autocracy. 
In this paper we can do no more than invite the attention of other 
scholars to investigate the problem further. At first glance it 
appears difficult to develop a general explanation which will work 
for all the following cases, but we ought to remember that there 
is a similar diversity in the range of European transitions from 
antiquity to feudalism, and from feudalism to capitalism, which 
has never prevented the search for general explanations. 
Java: The military success of Sultan Agung (1613-45), followed 
by the tyrannical excesses of Amangkurat I (1645-77) produce 
rebellion, Dutch intervention, and eventual permanent division 
of Java into competing kingdoms (1755). 
Bali: The 'Kingdom' of Bali, with its capital at Gelgel, fragments 
permanently into eight kingdoms, at the end of the seventeenth 
century. 
South Sulawesi: The domination of Makassar over the whole of 
South Sulawesi endures from 1610 to 1669, with steadily increasing 
centralization, until the Dutch conquest of Makassar brings about 
a fragmentation into numerous states and sub-states.5 
Banten: This was conquered by the Dutch in 1684, and thereafter 
Banten loses its international trade and its ability to control tightly 
its Sumatran dependencies. 
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Banjarmasin, Palembang, Temate, Johor, Brunei: Loss of 
international trade makes it increasingly difficult in late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to control dependencies 
of these kingdoms. 
Siam: The revolution of 1688 expells European state-trading 
partners of the King, and the early eighteenth century witnesses 
progressive loss of manpower from King to aristocracy.6 
Burma: The capital of Burma moves inland from Pegu to Ava 
1635, after which there was no strong royal role in international 
trade; and there was a steady decline of central control from 
the death of Tha-lun (1648) to the fall of Ava (1 75 2). 7 
There is a significant recovery in central authority in the 
nineteenth century, beginning earlier in Siam and Burma but also 
affecting the still-independent Indonesian states of Aceh and 
Lombok in the second half of the nineteenth century. In general, 
however, there is still an enormous gap between the picture given 
by the standard literature on nineteenth-century Southeast Asian 
states - Gullick on the Malay States; Brown on Brunei, Snouck 
Hurgronje on Aceh, Crawfurd on Siam, Friedericy on South 
Sulawesi,8 etc - and that on the states of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. 
Aceh 
Let us now turn to Aceh, the Islamic Sultanate at the northwest 
extremity of Sumatra, as a case study of this more general process 
of transition. At least among Indonesian states it has the unique 
advantage of a continuous history uninterrupted by direct outside 
intervention until the late nineteenth century, as well as some 
new data from Dutch and Acehnese sources. 
As in the cases sketched above, the contrast is extreme between 
the Aceh described by European travele1·s such as Admiral, de 
Beaulieu in 1629 and that described by Snouck Hurgronje and other 
Dutch scholars in the late nineteenth century. According to 
Beaulieu, Sultan Iskandar Muda could raise an army of 40,000 
men within 24 hours. He had in addition a permanent palace guard 
of '1,500 slaves primarily foreigners', together with 3,000 women 
who conducted guard and other duties in the palace. The armoury, 
containing over 2000 cannon, was under strict royal control,. with 
firearms issued to the army only at the time of a campaign.. The 
king's writ ran throughout northern and western Sumatra and much 
of the Malay Peninsula, and foreigners could trade for the coveted 
pepper only on his terms. Nobles were kept loyal by draconian 
punishments against them or their families, and by a system of 
rotation whereby one third of their number were held as hostages 
within the palace on any given night.9 Internally, the image of 
Iskandar Muda's power among later generations of Acehnese was 
such that all laws were conventionally ascribed to him, and his 
name was invoked on the seals of all subsequent sultans. 
The Aceh portrayed by the Dutch Islamicist Snouck Hurgronje 
identified real power in Aceh as lying with dozens of uleebalang 
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(1 08 were eventually recognized by the Dutch) who were hereditary 
'governors, judges and military leaders in their own country, in 
which ••••• they admit no higher authority•.lO The effective power 
of the Sultan was limited to his palace, even though he was honoured 
everywhere in Aceh.ll Although the Sultan had no capacity to 
affect the succession of uleebalang, the twelve leading uleebalang 
were autporized by tradition to confer the throne on the 
royally-born candidate of their choosing. 
As explained in general terms above, there is a superficial 
external cause of this transformation in the steady decline of 
Aceh's role as a major international port in the Bay of Bengal 
and one of the leading suppliers of the world's pepper - a decline 
which continued with few interruptions between about 1630 and 
1820. Although Acehnese pepper-exports revived strongly in the 
nineteenth century the capital no longer had enough control over 
the pepper-exporting areas to draw more than a token share of 
the revenue thus produced. The decline in trade is as much a 
consequence as a cause of internal transformation, however, and 
it certainly does not suffice as an explanation of the profound 
structural change. 
Although there has been considerable speculation on the origins 
of the nineteenth-century Acehnese system of uleebalang, together 
with the smaller mukim units below them and the federations 
of uleebalang called sagi above them, there has been insufficient 
data to resolve the issue. Snouck Hurgronje, a dominating influence 
on all subsequent scholarship, is particularly unhelpful on this 
issue. He was determined to portray the Sultanate as weak and 
irrelevant in order to kill any further attempts at peaceful 
negotiation with it in his own day, and in consequence he assumed 
without evidence that the uleebalang and sagi predated the Sultan. 
By contrast the argument we present here is that the key features 
of the 'diffuse' Acehnese political system of the nineteenth century 
took shape essentially in the half-century which followed the 
death of Tskandar Muda in 1637. 
The Acehnese state was formed in the two decades which 
followed the Portuguese appearance in Southeast Asia (1509) as 
the result of a counter-crusade against the Portuguese and their 
allies in the Malay World. The hitherto miniscule port state of 
Banda Aceh Dar as-Salam conquered Daya on the west coast (1520) 
and Pidie and Pasai on the north coast (1521 and 1524), in the 
process expelling the Portuguese who had intervened there. Through 
most of the sixteenth century the military struggle against the 
Portuguese· ir. Malacca helped unify under the Acehnese sultans 
the previously distinct states and cultures scattereo along 1,000 
miles of the Sumatran coast. 
The first reference we have to uleebalang is in this military 
context - among the Acehnese troops assaulting Portuguese Malacca 
in 1547.12 This Portuguese reference confirms the original meaning 
of uleebalang as war-leader, a usage which still occurs in Malay 
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(hulubalang) though retained in Acehnese only through the old 
literature, the everyday meaning having changed completely by 
the nineteenth century.l3 Acehnese chronicles already refer 
to the leading men of the kingdom as uleebalang by the 1570s,14 
that is following the warlike reign of Sultan Ala'ad-din Ri'ayat 
Syah al-Kahar (1539-71). It seems likely therefore that by this 
time uleebalang had a dual function as war-leaders and territorial 
chiefs, having been rewarded with grants of land in the areas 
conquered by earlier expansionist Sultans. The most valuable 
land of the time was undoubtedly along the northern coast, 
especially around Pidie arid Pasai, since this was the main source 
of pepper-exports in the sixteenth century )5 Such grants would 
have provided the means whereby uleebalang could furnish the 
men and resources needed for further military campaigns. Despite 
this development, the large pre-conquest states appear to have 
retained some identity as tributary states, since we know that 
a number of sixteenth century rulers appointed their sons as raja 
(rulers) of Pidie, Pasai, Deli (in East Sumatra) and Periaman (in 
West Sumatra).l6 One of the earliest lists of the great men of 
the realm, referring to 1579, begins 'all the raja, and kadi (religious 
officials) and uleebalang•)7 . 
We do not know whether the appointments of raja and of the 
uleebalang who were presumably subordinate to them were intended 
to have a permanent, hereditary character. They may well have 
begun to assume such rights for themselves in the 1570s and '80s 
when four successive Sultans were deposed or killed by the nobles 
of the capital. It is quite clear, however, that the two strongest 
rulers of the early seventeenth century had no time for any such 
hereditary claims, and went to great lengths in creating new local 
elites dependent wholly on themselves. The first of these 
exceptionally authoritarian rulers was Ala'ad-din Ri'ayat Syah 
Sayyid al-Mukammil (1589-1604) who reasserted royal power in 
no uncertain terms. Davis reported that 'he ended the lives of 
more than a thousand Noblemen and Gentlemen, and of the rascall 
people made new Lords and New Lawes [sic]•.18 According to 
Beaulie, who unlike Davis must have heard the story only 30 years 
after the event, this Sultan justified his tyranny by declaring: 
that as King, he did not wish to be only a shadow, nor to 
be the plaything of the fickle humours of the orangkaya 
(nobles), who after massacring him would have relapsed 
into their former disputes .•. that moreover his intention 
was to preserve peace for all, impose severe justice on 
evildoers, and reign equitably.l9 
The grandson and protegee of al-Mukammil, Sultan Iskandar 
Muda (1607-36), took this tough policy to new heights. It was 
also reported of him that 'He has exterminated almost all the 
ancient nobility, and has created new ones•.20 As we have seen, 
this Sultan also devised very effective means of retaining the 
loyalty of his new appointees. As described by the many European 
visitors to his capital, a complex administrative and judicial 
'Feudal' Aceh 203 
hierarchy developed under his authority, while the slightest hint 
of disloyalty or failure on the part of the uleebalang elite was 
punished with exemplary cruelty.21 
Some evidence of the way in which Iskandar Muda created 
new benefices for those he raised to office occurs in two surviving 
sarokata (royal decrees), one dating from the early eighteenth 
century and the other from the nineteenth century. Both record 
that in 1613 Sultan Iskandar Muda granted a certain Orangkaya 
a territory in Samalangu (un the north coast bordering Pidie) 
consisting of six mukim. Thirty or more years later, in the reign 
of Iskandar Muda's daughter, this grant was confirmed to the same 
beneficiarv who now had the title of Orangkaya Seri Paduka Tuan 
Seberang.2'2 The validity of these documents is confirmed by 
Dutch reports23 which identify this same man as Pariglima Bandar 
or port administrator under the Sultana Safiyyat al-Din until his 
death in 1663 (or 1658 according to the sarakata). As the sarakata 
also tell us that the land grant passed to his son, we may conclude 
that the benefice granted to a retainer by Iskandar Muda had 
become hereditary under his successors. 
There appears to be no reference to the mukim of Aceh earlier 
than this 1613 grant. The origin of the division of Aceh into mukim 
(from Arabic muqim, an adult male resid~>nt in a particular parish, 
and perhaps, by extension, the parish Ibelf) may therefore be 
due to the initiative of Sultan Iskandar Muda, as suggested by 
some earlier writers.24 Iskandar Muda was known as a great 
mosque-builder, a patron .of ulama (especially those of the Wujuddiya 
mystical school), and a promoter of Islamic law.25 He may 
therefore have appointed imam to be in charge of mukim throughout 
Aceh, in part to improve the practice of IslAm, hut abo to HCt 
as a check on the power of those uleebalang who enjoyed benefices 
comprising several mukim. Under subsequent, weaker rulers, 
these imam became hereditary, secular chiefs of their mukim; 
sometimes themselves assuming the ti.tle uleebalang as well as 
that of imam. Already in a decree of 1640 two imam were listed 
among a list of royal officials or vassals in Pasai and Samalanga 
who had to pay a specified annual tribute to the king.26 By the 
nineteenth century the imam who presided over Friday prayer 
at mosques throughout Aceh were entirely distinct from these 
chiefs of the mukim.27 · 
The benefice granted by Iskandar Muda in 1613 discussed above 
was almost certainly not an isolated one. For the following reign, 
that of Iskandar Muda's son-in-law Iskandar Thani (1636-41), the 
better evidence available to us shows a pattern of regular grants 
of land to retainers. One Dutch report in 1640 noted that one 
of the palace eunuchs, Seri Bijaya, was in charge of 'revenue from 
lands', and had to decide which lands would be granted as benefices 
to the officers in charge of the royal bodyguard.28 A decree 
probably from the same reign, recorded in the Acehnese compilation 
of edicts and law codes, the Adat Aceh, lists nine territories in 
the Pasai region with their approximate territorial limits. Many 
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of these belonged to the great men of the capital, including the 
Sultan himself, the Orang Kaya Maharaja and the Laksamana.2!1 
It is clear from the tight control Sultan Iskandar Muda exercised 
over his vassals and courtiers that any benefices granted were 
at his pleasure, and in no sense intended to be hereditary or 
permanent. It seems significant in this context that the royal 
decree or sarakata, which in the nineteenth century was taken 
as proof of an uleebalang's hereditary right to his territory, as 
late as 1660 described as an unsealed ordinance given by the ruler 
'until its recantation', in contrast to an Eseuteumi - a sealed decree 
of 'everlasting validity•.30 In the decades after his death in 1636, 
however the nature of these benefices appears to have changed 
fundamentally and become permanent. 
The choice of successors to Iskandar Muda is indicative of 
the ambivalent attitude of the court elite towards his reign. On 
the one hand the aura of his greatness continued; on the other 
nobody wanted to have to endure such a reign of terror again. 
Iskandar Muda appears to have left no legitimate male heir alive, 
but he had shown great favour to a captured Malay prince from 
Pahang, who as a boy of nine had been allowed to marry the Sultan's 
daughter and to occupy a prominent place at court. This foreign 
prince succeeded as Sultan Iskandar Thani, and his rule appears 
to have been peaceful and prosperous, though Aceh's external 
power vis-a-vis the Dutch was allowed to erode somewhat. 
At his death in 1641 the powerful orangkaya jockeyed for 
position for some days 'for· each one wanted to be king', according 
to a Dutch eye-witness.31 Eventually they resolved to crown 
the bereaved queen, Iskandar Thani's widow and Iskandar Muda's 
daughter, as the first female ruler of the country. Although she 
wa" held in great respect as the final arbiter in matters of state, 
the Sultana Safiyyat ad-Din Taj ul-Alam Syah (1641-75) had much 
less power vis-a-vis the half-dozen most powerful men of the 
realm than did her father. The horrendous executions and 
punishments for disloyalty, which marked the reign of Iskandar 
M uda and even to a lesser extent that of Iskandar Thani seem 
to have been wholly absent from her style of government. Both 
internal and external sources suggest that Aceh under this queen 
was well-ordered and prosperous, with a climate very favourable 
to foreign commerce.32 At her death in 1675 the experiment 
with female rule was deemed so successful that it was repeated 
three more times. 'The very name of kinge is long since become 
nautious to them, first caused through the Tyrannical Government 
of theire last king' [sic) (i.e. last but one - Iskandar Muda).33 
Female rule, in other words, had come to seem synonymous with 
a quite different political order, attractive to the dominant elite 
in the captial. 
It is not surprising that the leading orangkaya, most of whom 
had been courtiers or officials at the end of Iskandar Muda's reign, 
should have been reluctant to return to such a r·cgime. At the 
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very beginning of Taj ul-Alam's reign four of these orangkaya 
formed a kind of executive council which took many political 
decisions.34 Whereas tribute from Aceh's dependencies and 
exactions on trade went overwhelmingly to the ruler in Iskandar 
Muda's day, a large share now began to be channeled to these 
orangkaya.35 Dutch reports note that the great latitude the Queen 
allowed to her orangkaya gave rise to conflicts among them, so 
that the Sultana's remaining authority was largely derived from 
a careful balancing act between two major factions at the court.36 
The diversion of resources into the hands of a numerous oligarchy, 
however, unquestionably reduced Aceh's military capacity to resist 
the rising threat from the Dutch. The VOC became the dominant 
naval power in the Straits of Malacca after its capture of Malacca 
(1641), and Aceh seemed powerless to resist Dutch demands, carried 
out through a blockade in 1647-50, for a dominant share in Perak 
tin exports and West Sumatran pepper.37 
The conflicts between these orangkaya incidentally shed valuable 
light on changes in the attitude to royal benefices. In 1642, the 
resident Dutch factors reported, a dispute arose between the 
major court factions over rights to land in the rich rice-growing 
Pidie area. The Maharaja Sri Maharaja was alleged by his rivals 
to have acquired some of his lands in the region improperly during 
the reign of Sultan Iskandar Thani.38 Eventually the Queen resolved 
the question by ruling that only grants of land made by her father, 
Sultan Iskandar Muda, would be recognised as valid.39 The charisma 
of the great Sultan, in other words, was invoked to support a policy 
very different from his - making land-grants permanent and 
hereditary. Part of the reason for the installation of a relatively 
weak ruler, indeed, must have been to prevent a repetition of 
the carnage and the attendcnt re-allocation of benefices which 
had occurred under al-Mukammil and Iskandar Muda. 
The uleebalang and orangkaya who had once been granted 
land to assist them to fulfil their obligation to the king quickly 
became hereditary rulers of these territories, where possible tracing 
their claim to a grant from Iskandar Muda. By the time of the 
Hikayat Pocut Mohammad, written in the early eighteenth century, 
the term uleebalang carried its modern meaning. It represented 
the hereditary ruler of a number of mukim, needing to be wooed 
by any Sultan or aspirant Sultan before any action could be 
undertaken. 40 Many of these hereditary dynasties bore titles 
betraying their origins in officials of the royal court - Maharaja 
in Lhokseumawe (Pasai); Laksamana in Ndjong (Pidie); Mantroe 
(Malay Mantri, minister) in several other Pidie districts. 
We have explained above that sixteenth-century Acehnese 
kings appointed their sons as raja of conquered states - Pidie, 
Pasai, Deli and Periaman. This indicates that these large satraps 
remained as units above the level of the uleebalang benefices. 
The last such appointment appears to have been Iskandar Muda's 
of his only legitimate son as Raja Pidie in the early part of his 
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reign. 41 Iskandar Muda was intolerant of anybody, including his 
relatives, building a significant power base which might eventually 
be used against him. He therefore developed the institution of 
panglima (governor) as a means of controlling his provinces. The 
principal function of a pang lima appears to have been· to ensure 
that the tribute, port duties, and commercial regulations imposed 
by Iskandar Muda were implemented to the letter, so that the 
resources of the important export centres flowed to his treasury. 
We therefore hear most of panglima in the pepper-exporting areas 
on the west coast of Aceh. By 1621 the coast as far south as 
Padang was tightly controlled through two panglima placed at 
Tiku and Periaman. Beaulieu tells us that these officials were 
replaced every three years to ensure that they did not escape 
his control. While in office they had to report personally to the 
court every year.42 In 1633 Inderapura, further south, was added 
to Acehnese territory and a pang lima appointed there. 43 More 
panglima were appointed after Iskandar Muda's death, and in the 
1660s they were reported at seven west coast ports - Barus, 
Pasaman, Tiku, Periaman, Padang, Salida and lnderapura. 44 Each 
panglima had a small staff comprising two writers (kerkun), a 
weigh-mast (Penghulu Dacing), and a port security official (Pe~hulu 
Kawal), emphasizing the role of the office in controlling trade. 
In the provinces to the east of the capital export production 
was less crucial and the role of panglima accordingly less clear. 
Tin-rich Perak on the Malay Peninsula was under Acehnese authority 
for several decades after 1620, and an Acehnese panglima does 
at times appear to have been based there. 46 In such non-Acehnese 
territories, however, more attention appears to have been given 
to manipulating the indigenous raja or if necessary replacing him. 
A local Malay, Minangkabau or Batak hereditary elite continued 
to govern these territories even when Acehnese officials kept 
a tight control of the export trade. 4 7 
ln the inner areas of the north coast which must by this point 
be considered ethnically assimilated to Aceh, panglima may have 
been experimented with as a replacement for the role once taken 
in Pidie and Pasai by royal princes. There is a Dutch report as 
late as 1649 of a 'Panglima Pidie' presenting the Queen with a 
tribute of rice, coconuts, sugar and betel,48 and an earlier 'Panglima 
Pidie' was a hero of the Hikayat Malem Dagang set in the reign 
of Iskandar Muda. 49 In such areas, however, the uleebalang 
benefice-holders appear to have had direct relations with the 
court, and left little scope for a panglima. In the wars of the 
early eighteenth century many regional leaders carry the title 
of panglima, suggesting descent from one of these seventeenth 
century officials, but none had any special relationship with the 
capital. 50 It seems safe to assume that the office of pang lima 
as a device for controlling the provinces disappeared with the 
loss of the west coast pepper-growing dependencies in the 1660s. 
During the two decades following the death of Iskandar Muda, 
then, uleebalang benefice-holders appear to have established 
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permanent claims to estates made up of several mukim in Acehnese 
areas of the North Sumatran littoral. As the trade of Banda Aceh 
(the capital) and the ruler's share in it both declined steadily, 
such estates must have assumed gradually greater importance 
as against an advantageous place at court. The pepper exports 
which had been the key to Aceh's prosperity vanished with the 
loss of the West Coast ports and Deli under Taj ul-Alam. The 
valuable tin exports of Perak were lost at about the same time, 
leaving Banda Aceh dependent on the relatively modest export 
of gold, elephants, horses and forest products. Having always 
been affluent enough to import rice for its substantial urban 
population, Aceh towards the end of the seventeenth century 
had to expand greatly its own production of foodstuffs -particularly 
in the hitherto neglected Aceh River Valley adjacent to the 
capital.51 This in turn meant that uleebalang arose there with 
large numbers of men under their control, close enough to the 
capital to have direct influence on its politics. 
Although the first of Aceh's four queens, Taj ul-Alam (1641-75), 
was still strong and respected, this was less true of each of her 
successors in turn. In 1688, near the end of the reign of the third, 
an Italian missionary noted that 'they elect no more kings but 
Queens, though in fact it is seven of the nobles who rule the 
kingdom•.52 Ten years later a French visitor was sceptical whether 
the Queen even existed, since power was divided among the nobles 
of the court.53 This. type of oligarchy was favoured in the 
cosmopolitan commercial environment of the city, but these new 
uleebalang of the interior were increasingly intolerant of it. Their 
leader was the first Panglima Polem, reputedly an illegitimate 
son of Sultan Iskandar Muda and elder half-brother of Taj ul-Alam, 
who had settled at Gle Yeueng about 30 km above the capital. 
He and his son emerged during the period of female rule as the 
chief opponents of its continuation. At the death of each of the 
queens their followers demanded that the throne pass to this 
Panglima Polcm dynasty. In 1675, 1678, and 1688 they mobilized 
men from what became known as the Sagi (corner) of the XXII 
Mukim, centred on Gle Yeueng, to march on the capital in a vain 
attempt to decide the succession.54 When female rule was finally 
abolished in 1699, however, the throne passed to new men of Arab 
origin and then to men of Bugis extraction who competed for 
support among the uleebalang. In these struggles Panglima Polem 
became not king but king-maker, or more frequently king-unmaker. 
By the time relative stability returned in the 1730s, various 
aphorisms had become current asserting that Panglima Polem, 
either himself,55 or acting as one of three or twelve leading 
uleebalang of the Aceh Valley area (known as Aceh Besar), 56 
had 'the power to enthrone and dethrone Sultans'. 
In little more than half a century, an autocracy centred in 
a flourishing port had been transformed into a diffuse polity of 
hereditary nobles bound together by the memory and heritage 
of a common past. Just as the European vernaculars emerged 
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from the domination of Latin with the transition to feudalism, 
Acehnese emerged in the early eighteenth century from the 
hegemony of Malay, in which all known texts had been written 
during the literary 'golden age' which accompanied autocracy.57 
Another congruence with the European transition to feudalism 
was the rapid decline of slavery, which had relied, in autocratic 
Aceh as in Ancient Rome, on a successful urban culture with a 
high level of new slave recruits through warfare.58 Cultural 
assimilation, with the excessive cost of maintaining slaves, 
transformed the bottom class of Acehnese society into peasants 
owing numerous services to their uleebalang lord, yet perhaps 
not serfs in the sense that that category was juridically defined 
in Europe. 
Conclusion 
The social and cultural differences between Europe and 
Southeast Asia are sufficiently obvious to make anyone beware 
of applying the label 'feudal' to the diffuse political system we 
have described. Even though some classic characterisations of 
the key features of feudalism 59 are compatible with Aceh and 
other Southeast Asian societies in the eighteenth century, there 
are crucial features of the latter which remain very different 
- the autonomous role of cities, of the Church, and of law have 
no real equivalents in Southeast Asia, for example. We prefer 
to emphasize here that a transition of similar magnitude as that 
from Antiquity to Feudalism appears to have taken place in many 
parts of Southeast Asia, centring in the late seventeenth century. 
It is to such transitions, rather than to the pursuit of static 
equivalences, that the attention of historians should be primarily 
directed. 
NOTES 
1. Sukarno, Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (originally published 
1933 -Jakarta, n.d.), p. 10. 
2. R. Mohammad Ali, Perdjuangan Feodal Indonesia (Jakarta, 
1952 - though written in 1948). 
3. E.g. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, ed. Sartono Kartodirdjo, 
l\:larwati Djoened Poesponegoro, Nugroho Notosusanto 
(Jakarta, 1977), 6 Yols. 
4. Akin Rabibhadana, The Organisation of Thai Society in the 
Early Bangkok Period, 1792-1873 (Ithaca, 1969); Arthur 
Phayre, History of Burma (London, 1884), pp. 136-141; M.C. 
Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi (London, 
1974), pp. 18-21. On the other hand it is gratifying to note 
that the parallellism we emphasize here has also been recently 
noted by Victor Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: 
Anarchy and Conquest c. 1580-1760 (Princeton, 1984), pp. 
·271-92. 
5. A. Reid, 'A Great Seventeenth Century Indonesian Family: 
Matoaya and Pattingalloang of Makassar', Masyarakat 
'Feudal' Aceh 209 
Indonesia 8, i (1981), pp. 19-26; L.Y. Andaya The Heritage 
of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi in the 
Seventeenth Century (The Hague, 1981). 
6. Akin Rabibhadana, pp. 29-37. 
7. Lieberman, pp. 139-198; F.N. Trager & W.J. Koenig, Burmese 
Sit-tans 1764-1826: Records of Rural Life and Administration 
(Tucson, 1979), pp. 16-22. 
8. J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya 
(London, 1965); D.E. Brown, Brunei: The structure and history 
of a Bornean Malay Sultanate (Brunei, 1971); C. Snouck 
I-Iurgronje, The Achehnese (Leiden, 1906), 2 Vols; John 
Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General 
of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China (London, 
1928 - reprinted 1967)~ H.J. Friedericy, De Standen bij de 
Boegineezen en Makassaren ('s-Gravenhage, 1933). 
9. Augustin de Beaulieu, 'Memoires du Voyage aux Indes 
Orientales du General Beaulieu, dresses par luy-mesme', 
in Relations de divers voyages curieux ed. Melch. Thevenot 
(Paris, 1666), II, pp. 102-3. 
10. Snouck Hurgronje, I, p. 88. 
11. Ibid. I, p. 144. 
12. F.C. Dunvcr.,, The Portugurs<' in IwU:: (2 Vols, London 1894), 
Vol. 1, pp. 480-481, based on Faria e SousR, Asia Portuguesa; 
Dalgado, Glossario Luso-Asiatico (2 Vols, Coimbra 1919-21), 
Vol. 2, s.v. ORABALAO. 
13. Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Atjehsch-Nederlandsch Woordenboek 
(Batavia, 1934), II, p. 196. 
14. De Hikajat Atjeh ed. T. Iskandar ('s-Gravenhage, 1958), 
pp. 96-9; Bustanu's-Salatin, ed. T. TskRndar (Kuala Lum;1ur, 
1966), p. 33. 
15. 1'he Suma Orienta! of Tome Pires, trans. A. Cortasao (London, 
1944), I, pp. 138-45; The Book of Duarte Barbosa, trans. 
M.L. Dames (London, 1921), II, pp. 182-5. 
16. De Hikajat Atjeh, pp. 53-4, 64-5, 90-5, 169-83; 
Bustanu's-Salatin, p. 32; Hoesein Djajadiningrat, 'Critisch 
Overzicht van de in Maleische Werken vervatte gegevens 
over de Geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh', BKI 
65 (1911), pp. 154-8, 173-4; The Voyages and Works of John 
Davis, p. 153. 
17. Hikajat Atjeh, p. 96. 
18. The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, ed. 
A.H. Markham (London, 1880), p. 148. 
19. Beaulieu, p. 112; see also Anthony Reid, 'Trade and the 
Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. Three Stages: c. 1550-1700', 
in Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia, ed. A. 
Reid and L. Castles (Kuala Lumpur, MBRAS Monograph, 
197 4), pp. 48-9. 
20. Beaulieu, p. 63. 
21. Ibid. pp. 58-63; Pieter van den Broecke in Azie, ed. W. Ph. 
Coolhaas ('s-Gravenhage, 1962), I, pp. 175-6; The Voyage 
210 Feudalism 
of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 1612-1611, ed. W. Foster 
(London, 1934), p. 172. 
22. G. Tichelman, 'Een Atjehsche Sarakata (Afschrift van een 
besluit van Iskandar Muda)', TBG 73 (1933), pp. 368-73; 
Tichelman, 'Samalangasche Sarakata's', TBG 78 (1938), pp. 
351-8. 
23. Koloniaal Archief, The Hague (henceforth abbreviated K.A.) 
1051bis; 'Daghregister' of P. Soury (1642), ff. 568v.-9r., 
581 v.-2r.; Ibid., 'Copie daghregister' of P. Willemsz (1642-3), 
f. 506v., 517v.; K.A. 1059bis, 'Copie daghregister' of A. 
van Oudstschoorn (1644), f. 574r., 579v.; K.A. 1100, 'Originele 
missive' of D. Schouten, 16 Sept. 1655, f. 277v.; Daghregister, 
Batavia, 1663, pp. 633-4; Ibid., 1664, p. llO, 120. 
24. K.F.K. van Langen, 'De Inrichting van het Atjehsche 
Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat', BKI 34 (1888), pp. 390-1; 
Reid, 'Trade', p. 53. 
25. Bustanu's-Salatin, p. 36; Van Langen, 'Inrichting', pp. 390-2; 
Voyage of Thomas Best, pp. 171, 175n3; 'Oost-Indische Reyse 
onder den Admirael Wijbrandt van Waerwijck', pp. 12, 14, 
in Beginnende Voortgangh van de Vereenighde Nederlantsch 
Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Amsterdam, 1646), 
4 Volumes. 
26. Drewes and Voorhoeve (ed.), Adat Atjeh, VKI 24 (1958), 
pp. 114b-5b. 
27. Snouck Hurgronje, Th~ Achehnese, I, p. 85. 
28. K.A. 1051bis, 'Copie daghregister': of P. Willemsz. (1642-3), 
F. 503r. 
29. Adat Atjeh, pp. 110a-1b. 
30. K.A. 1127, 'Verbael' of B. Bort (1660), f. 340v. 
31. Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaff naar alle gewestern des 
werelds, beginnende 1639 tot 1687 incluis ('s-Gravenhage, 
1930), p. 13. 
32. Thomas Bowrey, The Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 
ed. R.C. Temple (London, 1903), p. 296; Bustanu's-Salatin, 
p. 59. 
33. Bowrey, The Countries, p. 296. 
34. Daghregista, Batavia, 1641-2, p. 96, 123; K.A. 1051bis, 
'Copie memorie' of J, Compostel, 10 Aug. 1642, f.594r.-v.; 
Ibid, 'Copie daghregister' of P. Willemsz., f.508r.; 
Bustanu's-Salatin, p. 60, 62-3. 
35. K.A. 1060, 'Verbael van Attchin' (1644-5), f.l67v.; K.A. 
1123, 'Raport' of B. Bort, 29 Jan. 1660, f.515r; K.A.1127, 
'Verbael' of B. Bort, ff.364r.-5r.; Daghregister, Batavia, 
1663, pp. 201-3, 633-4; Ibid., 1664, p. 480. 
36. K.A.1051bis, 'Copie memorie' of J. Compostel, f.593r. 
37. Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den 
Maleisch Archinel, ed. J.E. Heeres ('s-Gravenhage, 1895), 
vol. 3, pp. 345-6; S. Arasaratnam, 'Some Notes on the Dutch 
in Malacca and Indo-Malayan Trade, 1641-1650', JSEAH 
10, No.3 (1969), p. 486. 
'Feudal' Aceh 211 
38. K.A.1051bis, 'Copie daghregister' of P. Willemsz., f.527r. 
39. Ibid., loc.cit. 
40. Hikajat Potjut Muhamat: An Acehnese Epic, ed. G.W.J. 
Drewes (The Hague, KITLV, 1979), pp. 98-107. 
41. Beaulieu, 'Memoires', p. 103. 
42. Ibid. pp. 41, 44, 97. 
43. Tiele, P.A. 'De Europeers in den Maleischen Archipel', BKI 
36 (1887) pp. 244-5, 247 n.2; Kathirithamby-Wells, 'Achehnese 
Control over West Sumatra up to the treaty of Painan, 1663', 
JSEAH 10, No. 3 (1969), pp. 458-9. 
44. K.A. 1127, 'Verbael' of B. Bort, ff. 320r.-45r., 374r.-84r.; 
Kathirithamby-Wells, 'Achehnese Control', pp. 467-77. 
45. Thomas Best, The Voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 
1612-1614, ed. W. Foster (London, 1934), p. 65, 67-8, 179-80; 
Letters received by the East India Company from its servants 
in the East, ed. F.C. Danvers and W. Foster (6 vols, London, 
1896-1902), \ol. 2, pp. 287-8; Vol. 3, pp. 129, 188, 191, 220, 
222, 226, 235; Vol. 4 pp. 22, 125-7, 166-7; Vol. 5, pp. 30-1, 
171-2; Jan Pietersz. Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf 
in Indie, Vol. 7, pt. 1, ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas ('s-Gravenhage, 
1953), p. 396; the 'Verbael' of Bort listed in note (44) above. 
46. B. W. Andaya, Perak, the Abode of Grace: A Study of an 
Eighteenth-Century Malay State (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), 
pp. 42-9; K.A. 1040, 'Copie Missive', J. Harmansz., 3 Apr. 
1639, f.1234. 
47. K.A. 1127, 'Verbael' of B. Bort, f.320r.-v., 324r.-6r., 335r.-6v., 
340v.-1r.; Bouwstoffen, Vol. 3, pp. 498-9, 501-3; Corpus 
Diplomaticum Neerland-Indicum, ed. J.E. Heeres 
('s-Gravenhage, 1907-31), Vol. 1, pp. 345-7, 528-32; Vol. 2, 
pp. 165-8; Kathirithamby-Wells, 'Achehnese Control', p. 
479. 
48. K.A.l068, 'Copie daghregister' of J. Truijtman (1649), 
f.222r.-v. 
49. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, p. 87. De 'Hikajat Malem 
Dagang': Atjehsch Heldendicht, ed. H.K.J. Cowan (Leiden, 
KITLV, 1937). 
50. Hikajat Potjut Muhamat, e.g. pp. 45-7. 
51. Reid, 'Trade', p. 54. William Dampier, Voyages and 
Discoveries (London, 1931), p. 91. 
52. J.B. Morelli, cited in A. Meersman, The Franciscans in the 
Indonesian Archipelago (Louvain, 1967), p. 123n. 
53. De Premare to de La Chaise, 17 February 1699, in Lettres 
~difi.antes et curieuses, ecrites des missions etrangeres (de 
la Compagnie de Jesus), new ed. by Y .M.H. de Querbeuf 
(Paris, 1780-83), Vol. 16, p. 348. 
54. Reid, 'Trade', pp. 53-5. 
55. Hikajat Potjut Muhamat, p. 163. 
56. William Marsden, The History of Sumatra, 3rd Ed. (London, 
1811), p. 457. Van Langen, 'De Inrichting', p. 404. Reid, 
'Trade', p. 54. 
212 Feudalism 
57. Malay borrowings in Achenese are today characteristic of 
the language of the ruling class of uleebalang - another 
indication of the origins of this class in the cosmopolitan 
and cultured capital. (Information from Mark Durie.) 
58. Anthony Reid, Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast 
Asia (St Lucia, 1983), pp. 13-14, 170-2. Dampier, Voyages, 
pp. 98-9. 
59. E.g. Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L.A. Manyon (London, 
1961), p. 446; Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist 
State (London, Verso, 1979), p. 407. 
Banda tJ 
AcehR· 'iJie 
I! _ ~s .. ·amalanga_ 
. .. 1 (Lhokseumawe) Day a \, , '--;;' a · 
'~ \~ 
'\.____ eli 
\ i . 
~ ~LV 
Barus u'-
( 
~ \ 
Tiku 
Periar1an 
'Feudal' ACEH 213 
se~enteenth Century Aceh 
